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Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen
I wish to thank the organizing committee for the invitation to address your conference on the
subject of “megatrends” - ie, all embracing societal forces of change that are shaping our
future. You will appreciate that the rationale underlying “megatrends” is very complex
because of its systemic nature; it implies some understanding of the interwoven processes
which constitute the fabric of long-term societal change. It is therefore only possible for me to
present you here with a few outlines - simplifications, or models - of the complex forces that
are changing global society.
Within this context I see my task as, firstly, to identify and discuss a few of the most
important historical change levers (ie, the historical factors which initiated broad-based
societal change) and, secondly, to describe the nature and consequences of the societal
changes that followed. If I am presenting the case within a somewhat deterministic mould it is
only done to reinforce the key message that modern change is technology driven.
In this spirit of extreme simplification my presentation will centre on two periods, namely a
period of 200 years which spans an “age”, and a period of 50 years which spans a
technological “wave”. Our focus will primarily be on the past 200 years since the start of the
“Industrial age”. However, for the purpose of comparison it may also be usefull to focus
briefly on the two 200 year periods which preceded the industrial age (see Figure 1), namely
the Renaissance (broadly speaking ca 1375 to ca 1575) and the age of enlightenment (broadly
speaking ca 1575 to ca 1775).
The term 5HQDLVVDQFH means literally “rebirth”, and was for the first time used by the French
historian Jules Michelet to describe the period of approximately 200 years between the late
14th century and late 16th century when the fragmented feudal society of the Middle Ages,
with its church dominated social order, was transformed into a society in which central
political institutions, an urban commercial economy and lay patronage of education, arts and
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music became the norm. The
study of history (with
contributions by authors such as
Leonardo Bruni and Niccolo
Machiavelli) became a branch of
literature rather than of theology.
The 5HQDLVVDQFH started in Italy
and spread to the rest of Europe
during the 16th century. An
almost symbolic invention of this
age was the Gutenberg press,
which was named after its
inventor Johann Gutenberg of
Mainz in Germany. The
explosion in the printing of
books and position papers which
followed this innovation initiated
the first “information revolution”; one which LQWHUDOLD contributed towards the Reformation
and, in general, towards the rapid diffusion of new ideas and scientific theories throughout
Europe.
The concept “enlightenment” refers normally to the emergence in 18th century France of
progressive and liberal ideas that later contributed towards the French Revolution. My concept
of an “age of enlightenment” refers to the emergence in the late 16th century Europe of a new
scientific tradition which was stimulated by the contributions of earlier 5HQDLVVDQFH scholars
such as Galileo, Kepler and Copernicus. The scholar who opened the door towards a scientific
revolution was, however, Francis Bacon because he was the forerunner of the British
empiricist tradition. Sir Isaac Newton (17th century) and Rene Descartes (18th century) are the
other two scholars who are often linked to the concept of scientific reductionism - ie, the
methodology which forms the basis of modern scientific inquiry. It is argued in this paper that




Exactly 200 years ago Thomas Robert Malthus published an essay 2Q WKH SULQFLSOH RI
SRSXODWLRQ DV LW DIIHFWV WKH IXWXUH LPSURYHPHQW RI VRFLHW\ (Malthus, 1826) England was
entering the early stages of what later became known as “the industrial revolution”. This
“revolution” would profoundly alter its production systems, economy and social order within
the span of 50 years. Far more manufactured goods were being produced than ever before,
while technical efficiencies increased dramatically from one decade to another. This was













































by a process of capital accumulation and by the growth of corporate enterprises. Large
agglomerations (or clusters) of these enterprises developed rapidly within a few urban
concentrations of industrial activity.
There was as a consequence a steady migration to the cities by thousands of rural people who
were enticed by the prospect of new opportunities in these industrial growth centres. It was the
beginning of a new “modern” age of innovation-driven changes and capital-based wealth
creation; changes which liberated people from the confines of a specific station in life within a
semi-feudal society. However, they soon faced an equally severe new dispensation, namely
the class-based stratification of the new industrial society. The migrating JHPHLQVFKDIW-
oriented rural communities were suddenly confronted with the severe realities of the
JHVHOOVFKDIW (contractually) stratified society in the industrializing cities (Tonnies, 1955).
$GLVPDOIXWXUH
The conditions of poverty, squalor and social degradation in the squatter camps and ghettos of
early industrial England must have shocked Malthus. He postulated an emerging survival
crisis for a population which, according to him, was increasing at a JHRPHWULF rate, when the
natural resources which must sustain it were increasing at only an DULWKPHWLF progression.
These DULWKPHWLF increases in the natural resource base was assumed to be correlated with,
firstly, the fuller exploitation of existing natural resources and, secondly, with the “discovery”
of new productive regions. It was a period of territorial expansion and colonization, with the
European countries - and Britain in particular - acquiring more and more real estate around the
globe. But the globe sets also the limit to this expansion; ie, it confronts the “constant
tendency in all animal life (which include human life) to increase beyond the nourishment
prepared for it” (Malthus, 1826:2). Thus Malthus’ prognosis of ultimate disaster unless there
is “moral restraint” (or abstinence) in human procreation.
Malthus’ view on the rate of population growth at the time was certainly not without
foundation. The global population reached a figure of 500 million people around the time
Columbus discovered the Americas (ca 1500). It was at the start of an age of knowledge
explosion; the so-called “scientific revolution”. The foundation of the modern analytical
scientific method was prepared, and new competencies in a number of areas of human
enterprise - such as in agriculture, medicine and manufacturing - were developed. Trade and
the general level of economic activity expanded rapidly, as also the quality of life for many.
As a consequence rapid population growth became a notable factor of this post-5HQDLVVDQFH
period, and the global population doubled within 350 years to 1 000 million - ie, by ca 1850
(McHale, 1972). This was approximately 14 years after the death of Malthus, and 52 years
after he wrote his essay on population.
A futurist living around the end of the 18th century could therefore confidently select Malthus’
model as a basic framework for a prognosis of the future of mankind. It must have been
“clear” to all thinking individuals of the time that disaster is looming. In terms of the best
knowledge of the times there was a very real prospect that population growth would bump
against the ceiling of resource availability sometime during the 19th century.

7KURXJKWKHORRNLQJJODVV
Disasters did occur, but more in the shape of human conflict and wars about issues not
directly related to an impending natural resource crisis. These emerged rather in the form of
the assertiveness of the new industrial powers who wanted to use their new-found wealth and
technological-industrial capacities to enforce their designs over regions and populations. The
Victorian-era created a “Great” Britain - an empire over which the sun never sets. “God” was
an Englishman, however, a number of other “gods” were emerging in Europe, in the Americas
and in the Far East. Such a world is bound to experience a “battle of the gods”. This at first
found expression in the form of a number of expansionary wars, and ultimately in a slow but
persistent build-up of a new intense ideological conflict which was reflected in the
intensification of discord between capitalism and socialism, and between the conflicting
designs of nations who gained new political leverage from rapid industrial growth - thus
upsetting the balance of power. One can therefore say that the great wars of the 20th century -
ie, World War I, World War II and the Cold War - were the logical extensions of the
technology-driven power shifts which occurred during the 19th century.
And what phenomenal innovations did occur in the world during the 19th century! The
groundwork was prepared by innovations in steam power and the use of coal in iron
production during the late 18th century. It took off with the application of steam power to
transport and textile manufacturing. In the 70 years following the development of
Stephenson’s “Rocket” locomotive in the 1820s, and the introduction of rail transport in 1830
with the opening of the Liverpool-Manchester railway, the world saw a flood of ground
breaking innovations such as the introduction of telegraph networks, electricity, the telephone,
the internal combustion engine (including the Diesel engine), the motorcar and a large number
of other innovations which metamorphosed established socio-economic practices, and life in
general. Exponential growth became an accepted norm of performance, with only the rate of
growth being in dispute. Even more important, the main source of economic and political
power shifted irrevocably from the control of natural resources to the control of capital.
As a consequence, the industrializing world experienced a social, cultural and economic
revolution during the 19th century which was at least as momentous and disruptive in its
general scope and characteristics, as that of the transformations over the whole of the post-
5HQDLVVDQFH period between the end of the 15th century and the end of the 18th century. In
other words, the world for the first time in recorded history started to experience accelerated
change. One of the best indicators of this is the explosion in the global population which
occurred over the past 150 years. Within 75 years from 1850, ie, by 1925, the global
population increased to 2 000 million. The 3 000 million mark was reached 35 years later, in
1960, the 4 000 million mark 15 years later in 1975, the 5 000 billion mark 12 years later in
1987, and the 6 000 millionth person was born in this year - ie, an increase of 1 000 million
people within 11 years (McHale, 1972; 3RSXODWLRQ1HZVOHWWHU, No 62, 1996).

7KHPRUDORI0DOWKXV
What is the moral of Malthus for futurists? Not that Malthus was wrong as such in the
approach he followed in formulating his prognosis. As was already explained, he correctly
observed a disturbing increase in the rate of population growth, and the governing perceptions
of the time regarding the real basis of human sustenance would have convinced any 19th
century analyst that Malthus presented a very plausible prognosis of the future of mankind.
Malthus was without doubt a very unique and courageous thinker for his time. However, he
also suffered from a very common human blind spot in perception, ie, an inability to foresee
the inter-linking consequences of rapid technological change, and the long-term implications






Technological innovation is the primary driver of long-term change in society through its
creation of meaningful new capacities for human achievement (Marchetti, 1981). Once a
meaningful innovation is introduced into society it sets into motion a chain reaction of
initiating impulses which, LQWHUDOLD
• produces an autonomous (self reinforcing) capacity for improvement in a particular
technology;
• continuously develops new fields of application for a particular technology;
• develops associated clusters of complimentary and supplementary technology, which in
turn set in motion their own chain of reactions of other developments;
• creates new products, markets and industries - and destroys the old ones as the old
technology, which previously supported them, nears the end of its life cycle;
• creates new professions and skills - and destroys the old ones;
• creates new power basis and power relationships within society;
• changes life styles, cultures, values and, in general, the accepted norms of society;
• increases the reach between man’s power to do good things and to do evil things;
• creates the problem of growing complexity in the management of human affairs - for
example environmental problems, the problem to cope with the consequences of new
technological developments such as human cloning, and the problems of social
degradation, corruption and alienation because a growing number of marginalized people




Technological innovation is therefore not just a process of artifact improvement (eg, replacing
Pentium I processors in computers with Pentium II processors), but implies a general
improvement in the V\VWHP RI FRPSHWHQFLHV within which a new technological artifact is
applied. This V\VWHPRIFRPSHWHQFLHV flows through the machines, procedures and processes
that are used in human enterprise, the system of knowledge (or paradigm) of a society, the
organizations and institutions that serve society, the industries which generate the wealth, and
the state of development of a society in general.
This view of the nature of technological progress centres on a definite perception of the nature
of technology - namely, the perception that it is “embodied knowledge” and not just a
collection of artifacts. The word technology comes from the Greek WHFKQH which means skill
or art, and ORJRV which refers to the structure and principles of reasoning and sound thinking.
Therefore, at a more practical level, we can define technology as a system of interdependent
competencies which amplify human ability through the rational application of skills in the
solution of practical problems.
)LJXUH 7KHVWUHQJWKHQLQJF\FOHVZKLFKVSXURQWHFKQRORJLFDOLQQRYDWLRQ
,QGXVWULDOSURFHVVHV
Supportive industrial context 
for new technology. The 
development of industrial 
clusters provides support 
services for new technology
Improved industrial 
processes
New forms of organisations, 
new concepts for industrial 
processes and new industrial 
clusters in the industry
Integration with industrial 
processes and new process 
technology such as, eg, 
CAD/CAM
New knowledge, ideas, process 




Wide acceptance in society, 
increased technological 
capabilities and new uses for 
technology create new market 
clusters
Adjustments in the social 
infrastructure, in preferences 
and in the socio-economic and 
cultural context
New consumer product added to 
existing market and social order 
create a need for adjustments and 
market tension
Process support 
(by, eg, training 
and skills)
Market support 





Supportive market and community 
context for new technology
7HFKQRORJLFDOSURFHVVHV
Renewal and transformation
Development of new components 
for a technological artefact (eg, 
from transistor to micro chip)
A new product (eg, a 
technological artefact such as a 
personal computer)
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From this definition one can distill the following notable qualities of technological progress as
we experience it today, namely:
• It is centred in the mental capacity and skills of individuals, and in the knowledge base of
society - ie, not in some superior collection of machines and artifacts.
• Its sustainability is dependent on continuous and well balanced human and institutional
development.
• It is driven by three mutually reinforcing processes (see Figure 2), namely, industrial
development, science and technology development and economic development (which
translates into market development).
7KH0(,HYROXWLRQDU\SURJUHVVLRQ
The pattern of technological transformation tends to follow a 0(,HYROXWLRQDU\SURJUHVVLRQ
over the very long term - which underpins the so-called “ages” - and a OLIHF\FOH which maps
the emergence, rise and decline of a particular technology.
The notion of technological
evolution is analogous to that of
biology; artifacts being to
technology what organisms are to
biology. The 0(,HYROXWLRQ
refers to a shift in the dominant
orientation of technology from
the manipulation of Matter, to
the manipulation of Energy, to
the manipulation of Information
(Van Wyk, 1984). The 0(,
HYROXWLRQ process shaped and
transformed the ages of man -
not only in terms of the general
characteristics of productive
activities in a particular age, but
also in terms of the nature of its
society, its power relations and
mode of operation (see Figure 3). For example, during the pre-industrial age productive
activities were focused mainly on the manipulation and transport of physical things (matter),
mostly by using various kinds of tools and devices which were human and animal driven. The
basis of wealth and power was control over land and land resources, which by implication
means that a rural gentry tended to dominate the political and social scene.
The industrial age differed from the pre-industrial period in that it introduced the use of
inanimate energy (E) on a large scale in a process of mechanization. In other words, the tools












(Basis of social power: Control of land)
,QGXVWULDO$JH
(Basis of social power: Control of capital)
3RVW,QGXVWULDO1RPRFUDWLF$JH
(Basis of social power: Information, skills 
and knowledge)




energy. The basis of wealth and power shifted to capital, which translated into a slow but
persistent shift in power away from the formerly powerful rural aristocracy to an urban-based
capitalist elite; an elite which also includes the labour union institutions and political
movements with a strong support base in the union movement. An associated characteristic of
the industrial age is the increased strategic interest of the industrial powers in securing control
of the energy and mineral resources that are needed for their industrial growth process.
A number of authors hypothesized that we entered a postindustrial age sometime between the
middle of 1970s to the early 1980s, ie, approximately 200 years after the industrial age
emerged. The main distinguishing characteristic of this emerging age is the growing
importance of knowledge and information systems in everyday life, and particularly in
economic progress (see Figure 4). Within the context of manufacturing one observes a growth
in automation; machines have become automata. Within the context of organizations one
observes, firstly, a systematic increase in the scope and complexity in applications of
information systems, and secondly, a slow but persistent shift in the locus of organizational































information in global society
)LJXUH 7KHVKLIWLQJHPSKDVLVRIVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVDQGSURFHVVHVGXULQJWKHVHFRQGPLOOHQ
QLXP
Therefore, while the information age is creating incredible new capacities to communicate and
interact, a new powershift is once again occurring. Control over land and capital is becoming
progressively less important, and the mastery of knowledge and information systems more
important. Moreover, in this new world order the role of the skilled and trained individual as
the “holder” of the new empowering resource of knowledge generation becomes ever more
important, while the individual as manpower resource becomes ever less important. As a
consequence, this new world order spells a widening gap between the “haves” (of knowledge,
skills and information access) and the “have-nots”. A few more observations on these issues
are presented later in this paper.

7KHWHFKQRORJLFDOOLIHF\FOH
As was mentioned previously,
the life cycle maps the
emergence, rise and decline of a
particular technology such as
railroads or steamships (Modis,
1992:55-72). Technological
development normally follows
an S-shaped pattern which
indicates an early stage of
emergence (as the technology is
established), a stage of rapid
growth (as the technology
becomes institutionalized within
society), and a stage of maturity
and decline when the traditional
market of a technology starts to
decline as it becomes infested with new innovations which differ qualitatively from the older
one (see Figures 5 and 6).
)LJXUH &RPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQWUDQVSRUWLQIUDVWUXFWXUHH[SUHVVHGDVDSHUFHQWDJHRI WKHWRWDO OHQJWK
RIDOOWUDQVSRUWLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQXVHLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQDSDUWLFXODU\HDU
Source: Modis, T. 1992. Based on the work of Nakicenovic, N.  1988. Dynamics and replacement of US transport
infrastructure. ,Q Ausubel, JH & Herman, R (Eds). 1988. &LWLHVDQGWKHLUYLWDOV\VWHPVLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSDVW











We differentiate between smaller shifts in the market place when new “models” of a particular
technology replace the older ones, and the introduction of a new empowering technology
which initiate groundshifts in the social order. For example, General Motors’ innovation
during the 1920s was to produce cars which differ fundamentally in design and colour from
Henry Ford’s black Model-T Ford. By doing so they opened a new direction in motoring, and
succeeded to destroy the market for  Model-T Fords. Model shifts have a short-term cyclical
impact on socio-economic development. In contrast, the impact of a new empowering
technology can be considerable. It tends to rewrite the rules of socio-economic development,
producing in the process clusters of development and new industries, which in turn set in
motion a wave of innovation and economic growth.
The phenomenon of long cycles in economic activity was described by the Austrian economist
Joseph Schumpeter as “a gale of creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1947:81-86) following a
50 year cyclical pattern. Schumpeter was fascinated by earlier observations by Jevons (in
1884), by the Dutch economist J van Gelderen (in 1913), and the Russian economist ND
Kondratieff (in 1926) - who is perhaps the best known through the popularization of the
“Kondratieff long cycle” (see Ayres, 1990, Part I:1-3). More recent studies by J Forrester -
who applied systems dynamics modeling to the study of industrial growth processes, also
indicated the existence of a long wave of approximately 50 years in duration (Forrester, 1976).
:$9(6 2) &+$1*(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More recent research into the implications of technological innovation have identified four
definite technology-based long-term cycles of innovation, growth and stagnation over the past
200 years - ie, over the period that was earlier described as the “industrial age” (Marchetti,
1981; Ayres, 1990; Modis, 1992; Linstone & Mitroff, 1994). These seem to substantiate the
earlier findings of Jevons, Van Gelderen, Kondratieff and Schumpeter. The following
overview presents a summary of some of the most salient characteristics of the four
innovation waves (or quarters) of the industrial age, as discussed in the works of Ayres, Modis
and Linstone & Mitroff. For the purpose of simplification the industrial age is identified as the
200 year period between the 1770s and the 1970s.
7KH)LUVW:DYHWKHVWRWKHV&RDOLURQDQGFRWWRQWH[WLOHV
The first transformation towards the industrial age occurred in the last quarter of the 18th
century, ie, a shift away from the industrializing nations’ dependence on charcoal and water-
power to the large scale use of coal for energy. This required a quantum leap in the capacity
for mass transport in these rapidly developing economies, which was initially met by the
building of vast networks of canals which linked the major rivers of industrializing nations
such as Britain. The canals were primarily used for the transport of coal, and were extremely
profitable for a period of 50 years - ie, until the 1830s.
The steam engine gradually made coal-based energy available as a rotational motion, which
increased the scope of the application of coal power, both spatially and functionally. As a

consequence this stimulated a need for improvement in the materials that were used to build
steam engines, and also created vast improvements in manufacturing capacity for all kinds of
goods. Two other major innovations during the last two decades of the 18th century coincided
with the switch to coal during this period, namely an important new textile material, cotton,
and a new structural material, wrought iron. These two products became progressively cheaper
and more widely available (Ayres, 1990:3).
Improvements in iron technology, in steam engine design and in machine tool technology,
made coal-fired energy widely available as the primary source of rotational power for
manufacturing. At first stationary coal-powered machinery supplemented water power to drive
factory machinery, and finally they replaced water power. Then mobile coal-powered engines
started to supplement horse and wind power. The widespread application (or diffusion) of
steam power in transport was the key that opened the second technological transformation of
the industrial age: It produced railroad transport. By the 1830s rail transport became
technologically and commercially viable, and the monopoly of the canal system on the
transport of heavy materials was broken. It initiated a rapid decline in the profitability of the
canal systems, which in turn resulted in heavy losses in nominal wealth for the holders of
canal shares between 1838 and 1843.
7KH6HFRQG:DYHWKHVWRWKHV5DLOURDGVDQGVWHDPVKLSV
The advent of rail transport resulted in a massive construction boom in industrializing nations
such as Britain - which was a significant factor in the recovery of that nation’s economy after
the recession of the early 1840s. Railway construction also provided a strong impetus for the
expansion of iron production, the development of better iron making technology (such as the
hot blast technique) and, ultimately, the development of steel. Railways also triggered the
creation of telegraph networks. Moreover, the availability of efficient transport infrastructure,
and the development of coking technology, stimulated the innovation of gas-lighting in the
second half of the 19th century.
The powerful impact of the railway on middle 19th century Europe is best illustrated by the
1838 comments of Friedrich List, who was at the time a consul for the United States of
America in Germany. He wrote the following (Ebeling, 1995:14-15):
“ ,Q RUGHU WR IRUHVHH WKH IXOO HIIHFW RI VXFK GHYHORSPHQWV LPDJLQH WKDW HYHU\
FRXQWU\ DQG HYHU\ QRWHZRUWK\ FLW\ LQ (XURSH LV OLQNHG E\ UDLOZD\V DQG VWHDP
ERDWVDQG WKDW VHUYLFHVDUH VR UHJXODUDQG VXFK LPSURYHPHQWVDQG VDYLQJVDUH
PDGHLQWUDQVSRUWRSHUDWLRQVRYHUWKHQH[W\HDUVWKDW LW LVSRVVLEOHWRUHGXFH









+DQQRYHU WKH GD\ DIWHU WRPRUURZ $ 6D[RQ PDQXIDFWXUHU ZKR KHDUV RI QHZ
GLVFRYHULHVLQKLVILHOGLQ3DULVDQGLQ/RQGRQZLOOEHDEOHWRYLVLWWKHVHFDSLWDO
FLWLHV IRUDPRGHVW VXPDQGZLOORQO\ UHTXLUH WRGD\VDWPRVW IRU WKHZKROH
WULS$QHZLQYHQWLRQLVDOOWKHPRUHLPSRUWDQWDQGEHQHILFLDOWKHPRUHLWDIIHFWV




The third wave of change started with the emergence of the petroleum industry, the
substitution of steel for iron as an engineering material (being itself a spin-off from the
railway’s increasing need for more resilient metallic products), and the innovation of
electricity and the internal combustion engine. These innovations, and also developments in
the gas-light industry, provided the initial feedstock on which the rapid development of the
chemical industries was based. Moreover, the growth in the use of textiles resulted in an
increased demand for dies, soaps and bleaches, and a growing demand for illuminating oil
created a refining industry. These developments helped to stimulate innovations which led to
development of the internal combustion engine.
Just as in the case with coal, iron and cotton in the 18th century, these developments also had a
immense stimulatory impact on the economies of the industrializing nations. It resulted in a
spurt of new infrastructure development. This overlapped with the tail-end of railroad
construction which peaked around the second to third decades of the 20th century. A
combination of the innovation of electricity, of the telephone and of the motorcar created vast
new growth industries, and transformed the life styles of millions of people in the
industrialized world. A synergism between road networks and telephone networks - and the
development of mass road transport services - allowed for a dramatic decrease in inventories
as from the 1920s (Ayres, 1990:4). Clusters of other and associated innovations during the late
19th century include, LQWHUDOLD, deep freezing, artificial fertilizers, sewing machines, bicycles,
photography, moving pictures, the first electrical appliances, etc.
As was mentioned earlier, the increased rate and reach of industrialization not only changed
the shape of society, but also the shape of societal and political power in the industrialized
world. New “gods” appeared on the international scene, thumping their breasts while staking
out new claims on territorial hegemony. During 1914 this transformed into the 20th century’s
first cataclysmic event, ie, the four year long World War I. Despite the huge losses in
economic infrastructure and human life, this so-called “great war” also produced important
technological spin-offs, such as new aircraft technology and heavy road transport technology,
as well as new approaches towards large systems management. World War I represented an
important turning point for industrialization as a socio-economic process. It established the
terms of reference for a new global order where industrial power reigns supreme - ie, the
struggle for the control over capital representing the real struggle for power in society. By the

1920s the world had changed, figuratively speaking, into a “machine” (Mumford, 1990), with
various sectors of global society interacting with each other in a vast network of political,
economic and societal interdependencies. By the end of the 1920s this “machine” came
unstuck in a “great depression” which contributed towards the second cataclysmic event of
this century, World War II. It also sounded the end of the third wave of the industrial age, and
opened the path towards a fourth wave of innovations.
7KH )RXUWK :DYH WKH V WR WKH V  3HQWXS FRQVXPHU GHPDQG DLUFUDIW
PDWHULDOVWHFKQRORJ\DQGHOHFWURQLFV
According to Ayers (1990:5-6) the great depression, followed by World War II, resulted in
vast accumulation of savings and pent-up consumer demand. This pushed the postwar period
of sales expansion, involving much the same goods and services which fueled economic
growth during the last phase of the of third wave of the industrial age. However, some of the
first signs of the coming “nomocratic” world (where knowledge generation becomes the basis
of power) appeared on the horizon. There was a slowdown in the demand for steel, which was
roughly compensated by an increased demand for aluminium and plastics. A large number of
new chemicals, and processes to produce them, appeared on the market. New detergents,
synthetic materials, synfuels, synthetic rubber, polyesters, acrylics, polyethylene, and many
other creations of the human mind, flooded onto the market place. This was an early indicator
of the now well established trend which points towards a decline in the relative importance of
basic materials and minerals as a proportion of total manufacturing value added.
A second area of development during the fourth wave of innovations was that of electronics.
Building on discoveries such as that of Maxwell (in 1860), Hertz (in 1887), and Marconi (in
1896) - and other developments such as the vacuum tube biode early in the 20th century - the
electronics industry took of with a vengeance after World War II. The radio and television
industry, and the associated services, expanded rapidly and became a powerful feature of the
daily life of people around the world. But these developments pale into insignificance when
compared to the growing dominance of computer technology - especially after the innovations
in solid state electronics since the 1960s. It can rightfully be claimed that the development of
the high speed electronic computer was the key towards a large number of associated
innovations in space technology, new developments in materials technology and bio-
technology in the 1970s.
A third area of innovation of the fourth wave was in the field of air transport. Again, building
on developments that had already started early in the 20th century, air transport rapidly
developed a dominance in the market for mass passenger transport since the 1960s - cutting
into the markets of the passenger train, long haul bus services and the passenger ocean liner.
Within the short period of two decades since the 1950s the global passenger transport scene
changed radically, and the world was suddenly much smaller. Together with the innovation of
electronic media and the growth of computer networks, this prepared the stage for the
emergence of the global citizen in an ever shrinking postindustrial world.
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Let us now return to the hypothesis, presented earlier in this paper, that the world entered a
postindustrial information age sometime between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The
word “postindustrial” first appeared in print in 1917 (Nelson, 1996:479). However, the first
comprehensive review of the concept appeared in 7KH&RPLQJRIWKH3RVWLQGXVWULDO6RFLHW\ by
Daniel Bell which was published in 1973 (Bell, 1973). According to Bell the economy of this
new society will be marked by a change from a goods producing economy to a service
economy. Socially it will be marked by the pre-eminence of a professionally and technically
skilled class, and in decision-making by the creation of new kinds of “intellectual
technology”. Other related concepts which also appeared in print are “information society”
(Naisbitt, 1984), “service society” and “knowledge society” (Drucker, 1969).
Another description of an emerging postindustrial world is that of Kostoupolos (1988) who
refers to a “nomocratic society” where knowledge is not the servant of the people but in fact
the master. “Intelligence” is, according to Kostoupolos, its specific “labour force”. It
incorporates (and integrates) human cognitive qualities, artificial intelligence, stored
knowledge and information networks. He argues that knowledge would be the “axis” of a
future (postindustrial) nomocracy, just as landed estates represented the “axis” of the pre-
industrial world, and capital that of the industrial world.
Others, such as Senge (1990) and Marchetti (1981) write about “learning” organizations and
“learning” societies. The essence of such societies and organizations is the need to remain
competitive (in order to survive) in a world dominated by high rates of innovation. There is
therefore a need for continuous improvement and renewal.
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Under the heading “Information Society” Ruben Nelson (1996) presents a few interesting
pointers towards a changing scene and its possible implications:
• In 1954 only 20 computers were shipped to customers, and only 160 computers were in
use in Europe in 1958. In contrast, by the early 1990s 140 million computers were in use
worldwide and 400 million microprocessors were imbedded in motorcars, telephones,
televisions, and in a number of other appliances. By 1994 the Internet had over 30 million
users worldwide, and this figure is growing rapidly.
• In the mid-1950s, approximately 80 percent of the cost of a new motorcar represented
wages and materials. The cost of services and information accounted for the rest. By the
mid-1980s these ratios were reversed, ie, 80 percent for services and information.
• By 1991 computer hardware and software exports from the United States amounted to
R250 billion, which was more than double the value of motorcar exports.
• One can now add to these trends the now well known statistic of a doubling in the
computing capacity of computer technology every two years
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Nelson points towards a few important implications of the onset of a knowledge based world
order, namely:
• The need for a new epistemological foundation - a new understanding of what knowledge
is, how it is created, how it is validated and what its economic role is in an age based on
the concept of knowledge and information (ie, in the same way as there was an
understanding of the role of land in the pre-industrial world, and of capital in the industrial
world).
• A challenge to put knowledge to practical use - which refers to a growing threat of being
drowned in a sea of useless knowledge (or educating the unemployable).
• A growing preoccupation with the formulation of subcultures for self-critical learning and
self-monitored performance - which represents a return to the concept of community (but
this time around within the context of QRXV), emphasizing the need for learning as an
enculturalization process.
• A growing difficulty of effective governance as unconvinced minorities undercut majority
decisions because they are progressively better informed, and have the ability to utilize
informal networks and the media
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It should be obvious that a new knowledge- and information-based world order will be based
on different premises and rules for the effective management of organizations and societies. A
few pointers towards the likely nature of this shift are presented without defending the
particular position, ie, it is suggested that the coming information and knowledge-based world
order means:
• A systematic shift from machine and organismic based organizational forms which are
centrally directed, towards team based participative organizations in which the individual
plays a pivotal role (Ackoff, 1994).
• At the level of national governance, a shift from representative democracy towards
participative democracy.
• The demise of centralist institutions (structured around specific value chains) which
emerged during the industrial age, with a growing emphasis on organizational learning and
adaptability - and thus the decentralization of services and management structures (Evans
& Wurster,1997).
• A growing need for effective global governance (but not more global control) through
improved information flows and communication.
• A need for continuous improvement in the access to effective knowledge and information
- especially of importance for the survival and development of the less developed parts of
the world.
• A growing need for a fresh approach towards the management of complexity - such as, for
example, applications of social systems sciences in problem solving.
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• A growing need for the exchange of ideas, skills, knowledge and information, locally and
globally, and the emergence of a global QRLWLFPDUNHW (after the Greek QRXV, for mind).
• A relative decline in the power of the nation state because progressively more of the
state’s economic powers will be affected by the global integration of the international
capital market, by electronic transfers dominating international capital flows, by the
international electronic media and communication systems, by the “global factory” and
“global market place”, and thus by the growing need for international competitiveness -
which in turn sets the specifications for the most appropriate (or globally acceptable)
social and economic order for a country (Ohmae, 1995).
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This paper argued that the world is today entering a new age which will, in all likelihood, be
as different from the industrial age as the industrial age was from the pre-industrial period.
What the ultimate nature of this new world order will be is still unclear - in many ways we are
again “flat earth people”. We can only detect the outlines of the patterns of change that we are
facing. Therefore, like Malthus, we are running the risk of building our scenarios of the future
around extrapolations of our current perspectives and experiences, while we should also
consider the full (interlinking) implications of the trend breaks and groundshifts that are
certainly to follow with the coming of a “noitic age”.
What we do know, however, is that the quality of our management of global affairs over the
next 20 to 30 years will determine our success in gaining the most from the exciting promises
offered by a knowledge and information driven world order. This much we can learn from our
experiences over, especially, the past century. The industrial age produced great wealth, and
even welfare, for the industrial nations. Hovever, it also produced a number of serious
imbalances and inequities in the world - imbalances and inequities which threaten to destroy
all the good things that flowed from global industrialization. For example, the full benefits of
200 years of technological innovation were enjoyed by only one quarter of the global
population. More in particular, it would be important to find solutions to the following four
vexed problems of global governance:
• Given current trends, the global population is expected to increase from 6 billion to 10
billion within 50 years, while at least 90 percent of the additional 4 billion people will
have to subsist in severe poverty, not being able to enjoy the fruits of the coming
dispensation (unless something is done about their situation, which will, in turn, have a
positive effect on the prognosis of unbalanced population growth).
• The global environmental threat is something that will remain with the coming generation
for a period of at least another 50 years - that is even with the shift towards a post-
industrial world order and growing environmentalism in the world - because of the current
imbalances in the global distribution of economic development and wealth, with a real
possibility of rapid increases in air, water and land pollution as the share of the economic
wealth of the new industrializing regions increases.
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• There is a growing threat of political imbalances in the now rapidly developing “Third
World” - ie, the kind of imbalances experienced in the industrialized world over the past
century - and this may well become the most important threat to global security over the
next 50 years when regional “demi-gods” start to flex their new-found muscles.
• There is a growing threat of “scientism” as human ability to make shattering new
discoveries outstrips the wisdom to apply this new knowledge wisely - a threat which is
compounded by growing fragmentation in the process of scientific inquiry, and especially
the seemingly growing divide between the humanities and natural sciences.
• A lack of understanding of the nature and workings of complexity (Cilliers, 1995) may
well be our undoing when society and nature rebounds in unexpected ways, producing
new kinds of social pathologies and new mutants of old diseases or environmental
problems - mutants and problems for which we may find no effective cures and solutions.
Hopefully a post-industrial “noitic age” could offer the solutions for these potentially
disastrous trends because of the increasing effectiveness of knowledge and information-
systems. Human beings function according to their perceptions, which will hopefully be
affected by a better insight and understanding of the important implications of these issues.
The shift in the basis of organizational power towards “embodied wealth” - ie, a shift towards
skills and the competencies of the individuals in the organizations - holds another important
message for the “merchants” of knowledge and information. The mode of transferring wealth
in this coming “age” will not be through the transfer of capital or funds, but through the
distribution of information, knowledge and skills to the less fortunate sections of society.
Similar to the industrial age (capitalist/socialist) debate on the control over capital, one
should, therefore, also expect a new and intense debate around the concept of social equity in
the access to information, knowledge and learning (the “noitic market”) within society -
globally and locally. Relevance and effectiveness will be the key standards of performance of
this “noitic market”, and the measure of success will be improvement in human development.
The responsibility of the “merchants” of the “noitic market” will be to design the strategies
and the systems for education and information which can accomplish this.
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